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Watergate and Constitutional Power
A Perspective for United States
v. Nixon
By
William F. Swindler
(Lincoln '58)
The Separation of Powers Tradition
The constitutional crisis of 1973-74
provided, among other things, an ulti-
mate judicial commentary on the prin-
ciple of separation of powers as enun-
ciated by James Madison in 1788.
Writing in The Federalist, Madison
declared: "unless these departments be
so far connected and blended as to
give each a constitutional control over
the others, the degree of separa-
tion . . . essential to a free government,
can never in practice be fully main-
tained."' This theory of a kind of
contrapuntal political harmony long
awaited, and finally received, a judicial
construction which, if not fully defini-
tive, is at least a more tangible concept
of constitutional law.
In United States v. Nixon,2 the
climax in a series of judicial excursions
into this unexplored territory, the
petition of the Special Prosecutor put
the basic issue as follows:
Whether a claim of executive
privilege based on the generalized
interest in the confidentiality of
government deliberations can block
'The Federalist (Cooke ed., 1961), No. 48.
242 U.S.L. Wk. 5239 (July 23, 1974).
3 Cf. also Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F. 2d 700
(1973).
(
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the prosecution's access to evidence
material and important to the trial
of charges of criminal misconduct
by high government officials who
participated in those deliberations,
particularly where there is a prima
facie showing that the deliberations
occurred in the course of the crim-
inal conspiracy charged in the in-
dictment.4
4 Docket No. 73-1766 (Sp. Ct. Oct. Term
1973). Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
p. 3 .
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The unanimous Court answered in the
negative; under the circumstances of
the Watergate affair as it had devel-
oped by the early summer of 1974,
the judicial power was "so far con-
nected and blended" with the execu-
tive as to give the one "a constitu-
tional control" over the other to pre-
vent the frustration of the essential
functions of the judicial process.
From 1788 to 1974, American con-
stitutional thought had been both un-
certain and ambivalent on the matter
of discretionary powers in the execu-
tive. At the one end of this time
frame, colonial memory translated
executive discretion into arbitrary
authority; at the other, in 1971, the
Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia reiterated some of this his-
toric conviction when it declared that
no official of the executive branch
could properly be the sole judge of his
own privilege.s In between these
dates, political and judicial commen-
tary has been sparse and rather contra-
dictory. Alexander Hamilton, another
contributor to The Federalist, believed
that the constitutional checks upon
Presidential power were substantially
greater than those upon state gover-
nors;6 but a generation later Joseph
Story recognized "incidental powers,
belonging to the executive depart-
ment, which are necessarily implied
from the nature of the functions
which are confided to it."' Four
times, between 1925 and 1968, the
Supreme Court gave differing state-
ments on the general principle.8
sCommittee for Nuclear Responsibility v.
Seaborg, 463 F. 2d 788 (1971).
6 The Federalist, Nos. 69, 70.
'Commentaries on the Constitution
(1836), III, Sec. 1563.
'Cf. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52
(1925); Humphreys' Exec. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935); Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579 (1952); Wiener v. United States, 357
U.S. 349 (1968).
The issue as it developed in the
Watergate crisis was confused to a
certain degree by a confusion of terms.
English common law and constitu-
tional law have both distinguished
between privilege, which was an insula-
tion from the arbitrary power of the
crown, and prerogative, which in es-
sence was what remained of this power
in the course of parliamentary curtail-
ment. As for the Constitution of the
United States, the term, "privilege,"
appears only in two contexts, and
neither is the context of Aricle II.
Moreover, the original meaning of the
term as used in English law is evident
from these contexts: in one case it
clothes members of Congress with
certain immunities under certain cir-
cumstances; 9 in the other case it re-
lates to individual citizens, and there
its conjunctive expression- "privileges
and immunities"-corroborates the
meaning.' 0
As to prerogative, it has been treat-
ed as alien to American theory, unless
one accepts as a term of art Holmes'
reference to the courts' "sovereign
prerogative of choice."" Even if the
term be extended to the executive
branch, it still is subject to the English
definition-an authority inherent in
the sovereign. (e.g., executive) until
the legislative branch curtails or extin-
guishes it.12 Lord Coke's renowned
aphorism, "the King is under no man,
but under God and the law," is better
phrased in another part of his com-
mentaries: "the King hath no preroga-
tive but that which the law of the land
allows him."" A twentieth-century
' U.S. Const., Art. I, Sec. 6, Cl. 1.
10 U.S. Const., Art. IV, Sec. 2, Cl. 1; and cf.
Long v.Ansell, 293 U.S. 76, 83 (1934).
" Holmes, Law in Science and Science in
Law, Collected Legal Papers (1920), 239.12Cf. Dicey, Law of the Constitution
(1885), 424.
" Case of the Proclamations, (1610) 12 Co.
Rep. 74.
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English court has reiterated the prin-
ciple. 14 The common law principle-
now potentially, if not actually, ap-
plied to American constitutional law-
is thus unequivocal: discretionary
power in the executive is continually
subject to legislative and judicial defi-
nition and prospective curtailment.
First Judicial Test:
The Grand Jury Subpoena
In midsummer 1973 the Watergate
grand jury in the District of Columbia
issued its historic subpoena for certain
White House tape recordings and re-
lated documents. The subpoena was
necessarily directed to the President,
said Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox
in the petition for a show cause order,
"because the President took the unus-
ual step of assuming sole personal
custody . . . once the existence of the
evidence was admitted." This circum-
stance in turn led White House counsel
Charles Alan Wright to declare that
"the President has an absolute right to
withhold material evidence merely by
his own ipse dixit whenever he asserts
that non-disclosure would be in the
public interest and even though he has
a personal and private interest in the
question."' 5
The District Court rejected the
White House argument: "Executive
flat is not the mode of resolution of a
conflict of views over the scope of
executive privilege."" Indeed, where
"Attorney General v. DeKeyster's Royal
Hotel, Ltd., (1920) A.C. 508.
Is Verified Petition for an Order, etc., In re
Grand Jury Subpoena, Misc. Docket No.
42-73, U.S. District Court for District of
Columbia, July 26, 1973, p. 21.
1
6 In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 360 F. S. 1, 6
(1973).
the conflict concerns a non-discre-
tionary matter, e.g., "the obligation of
the President to provide evidence," the
court concluded, the issue of privilege
is irrelevant.17 The Court of Appeals
sustained the District Court, finding
that "a limited requirement that the
President produce material evi-
dence ... is required by law, and by
the rule that even the Chief Executive
is subject to the mandate of the law
when he has no valid claim of privi-
lege." 18
If privilege is in fact relevant, the
Court of Appeals disposed of the
White House argument with little hesi-
tation: "Sovereignty remains at all
times with the people, and they do not
forfeit through elections the right to
have the law construed against and
applied to every citizen."1 9 Further,
the court declared, it is not to be
assumed that "an act is discretionary
merely because the President is the
actor," 20  and if discretion equates
with privilege, "the courts have repeat-
edly asserted that the applicability of
the privilege is in the end for them and
not the Executive to decide." 2 1
In the context of the special cir-
cumstances of the grand jury subpoena
of 1973, the appellate opinion in
Nixon v. Sirica established at least two
principles: (1) executive privilege is
confined exclusively to discretionary
actions, and (2) the determination of
whether a particular action is discre-
tionary lies with the judiciary. Correla-
tively, the opinion, corroborating the
District Court holding, makes clear
that where an action is non-discre-
tionary the executive is subject to
"Id., n. 21.
"Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F. 2d 700, 722
(1973).
'
9 Id., at 711.
20 d., at 712.
21 Id., at 713.
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judicial process to compel proper com-
pliance. 2
Second Judicial Test:
The Senate Subpoenas
While the judicial branch thus con-
firmed its own power to compel exec-
utive compliance, the initial efforts to
enforce subpoenas undertaken by the
Senate Select Committee on Presiden-
tial Campaign Activities (the Ervin
Committee) were dismissed by the
District Court with prejudice. 23 Treat-
ing the Select Committee's motion for
summary judgement as a civil com-
plaint, and therefore raising the thres-
hold issue of jurisdiction, the court re-
jected the arguments for a valid statu-
tory (n.b., not constitutional) basis for
jurisdiction as asserted by counsel for
the Committee.2 4 Suggesting that the
court was being requested "to invoke a
jurisdiction which only Congress can
grant but which Congress has hereto-
fore withheld," the opinion declined
to reach the merits but at the same
time sent a clear signal to Congress
itself.
Reading the signal, Congress
promptly enacted legislation vesting in
the District Court the specific jurisdic-
tion it complained that it lacked.
22 "We note ... that courts have assumed
that they have the power to enter manda-
tory orders to Executive officials to com-
pel production of evidence. While a claim
of absolute Executive immunity may not
have been raised directly in these courts,
there is no indication that they enter-
tained any doubts of their power." Id., at
714, citing Environmental Protection
Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 93 (1973).
"Application of Senate Select Committee,
etc., 361 F. S. 1282 (1973).24Id., at 1283.
2sAct of December 3, 1973, P. L. 93-190
(93rd Cong., 1st Sess.).
The bill became law without Presiden-
tial signature-another rare constitu-
tional procedure-and the Select Com-
mittee promptly issued a large number
of new subpoenas for White House
tapes and other records. Paradoxically,
however, once the jurisdictional stat-
ute had been passed, neither the Sen-
ate Committee nor later the House
Judiciary Committee showed any great
interest in renewing the judicial test.
Aware that time was running against
the executive, the legislative branch
elected to let the Special Prosecutor,
now Leon Jaworski, and the courts do
their work for them on the assumption
(which turned out to be correct) that
relevant materials would in due course
make their way from the judiciary to
the legislative.
This course of Congressional policy
was, from a constitutional viewpoint,
the most unsatisfactory feature of the
great Watergate crisis: it left com-
pletely unresolved the question of the
extent of Congressional power in refer-
ence to Madison's theory of interde-
pendent government powers. After a
tentative movement in the direction of
judicial definition, Congress elected to
restrict itself to political procedures.
There were doubtless many explana-
tions: by early 1974 the Senate Select
Committee was beginning to wind
down its activity at the same time that
the House Judiciary Committee was
warming to its own task; the sensa-
tional gaps and discrepancies in tapes
submitted to the grand jury by White
House counsel, now James St. Clair,
and the oncoming trials of certain
Watergate defendants all played a part
in dissipating efforts to achieve a
definitive constitutional statement on
legislative subpoena authority in this
context.
18 THE BRIEF * Fall 1974
Obiter: The Agnew Case
The collateral constitutional crisis
revolving about Vice-President Spiro
T. Agnew brought to the fore even
more ambivalent Article II matters,
which nonetheless have contributed to
the considerations which must go into
an ultimate definition of executive
privilege and its limitations. First, was
the question of the true nature of the
vice presidential office per se-was it
analogous, so to speak, to an estate in
being or an estate in expectancy?
Second, did any privilege in the execu-
tive office, and specifically in the
Chief Executive, extend to one whose
only express constitutional function is
to be designated to succeed to the
Presidency in the event of a vacancy?
In the alternative, was the Vice-
President, as the presiding officer of
the Senate, subject to the general
provisions of Article I (including Con-
gressional privilege) rather than to the
concept of privilege under Article II
upon which the White House was
relying?
The proceedings of the grand jury
impaneled and sitting in Maryland 26
involved prospective criminal action
against the Vice-President, and Mr.
Agnew's counsel undertook to argue
that either as an executive officer in
futuro or as a legislative officer de
facto, the Vice-President was immune
from criminal process until removed
from office by impeachment, resigna-
tion, or expiration of his term. 27
While counsel relied on the language of
the Impreachment Clause28  to sup-
port this argument, it was further
2 6 Application of Spiro T. Agnew, In re
Grand Jury Proceedings, Civil Docket No.
73-965 (October 10, 1973).
2
'Memorandum in Support of Motion, id.,
September 28, 1973.
2 U.S. Const., Art. II, Sec. 4.
contended that one officer of the
executive department-the Attorney
General-ought not to be heard to
charge criminally another member of
the executive branch. Indeed, the lan-
guage of the memorandum referring to
this policy consideration strikingly
illustrated the ricocheting problems of
an administration already beginning to
disintegrate: "The Framers [of the
Constitution] could scarcely have in-
tended that the President should have
the power forthwith to incapacitate
his rival effectively by a unilateral
judgement of the Attorney General,
the President's direct appointee.' 29
It is worth noting that an analogous
argument was advanced by Mr. St.
Clair in United States v. Nixon, the
contention being that the courts lack-
ed jurisdiction over an "internal dis-
pute of a co-equal branch."o St.
Clair's brief also challenged the Water-
gate grand jury's naming of the Presi-
dent as an unindicted co-conspira-
tor3 -another novel and, indeed, un-
precedented procedural step which the
Supreme Court declined to consider.,
holding it to have been improvidently
brought. 32  For any collateral legal
argument on these matters, students of
the constitutional issues are thrown
back upon the Agnew case. There the
responding memorandum of the De-
partment of Justice emphasized the
limitation of privilege to Article I,
called attention to the unimpaired
constitutional status of the Vice-
President Aaron Burr while subject to
indictment in two states,3 3 and sug-
gested that immunity was to be im-
plied only if subjecting a government
29 Loc. cit. n. 26 supra, at p. 18.
soDocket Nos. 73-1766 and 73-1834 (Sp.
Ct., October Term 1973). Brief for Re-
spondent, pp. 27-44.
31 Id., at 115-122.
3242 U.S.L. Wk. 5237, n. 2.
"Cf. United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 30
(Case No. 14,692d) (1807).
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officer to criminal process would sub-
stantially impair his official func-
tions. 4 But this whole matter was
mooted when, on October 10, 1973,
the Vice-President appeared in the
District Court in Baltimore to enter his
plea of nolo contendere, at the same
time resigning his office.
The Final Judicial Test:
The Nixon Case
Against the background of the re-
spective judicial tests of grand jury and
Congressional subpoena powers, the
collateral question of Vice-Presidential
status, the Senate committee investiga-
tion of Watergate and related political
issues, and the House Judiciary hear-
ings on impeachment, the final test of
intergovernmental powers began on
April 18, 1974 with the issuing of a
subpoena duces tecum by Judge John
Sirica's court for the District of
Columbia.35 The subpoena was issued
in the case of United States v. Mitchell
et al., then involving seven former
officials of the White House Staff or
the Committee for the Reelection of
the President.3 6
On appeal from the subpoena
order, the Supreme Court in United
States v. Nixon concerned itself with
two overriding considerations: justi-
ciability and the claim of privilege. As
'Memorandum for the United States Con-
cerning the Vice-President's Claim of Con-
stitutional Immunity, loc. cit. n. 26 supra.
s Loc. cit. n. 30 supra. Brief for the United
States, p. 1.
-42 U.S.L. Wk., 5239, n. 3. One defendant,
Charles Colson, pleaded guilty to a lesser
charge and was removed from this group
of defendants.
to the first of these, Chief Justice
Burger stated unequivocally: "The mere
assertion of a claim of an 'intra-branch
dispute,' without more, has never
operated to defeat federal jurisdiction;
justiciability does not depend upon
such a surface inquiry." In any event,
the Chief Justice continued, an admin-
istrative regulation denying interposi-
tion of executive privilege in the case
of the Special Prosecutor3 7 was a rule
which the United States itself, "as the
sovereign composed of the three
branches," is bound to enforce.
At the heart of the matter, and
extending back to Madison's inter-
dependency principle, was the defini-
tion of executive privilege or discre-
tionary power. As to this, the Court
declared at the outset:
In the performance of assigned
constitutional duties each branch of
the Government must initially
interpret the Constitution, and the
interpretation of its powers by any
branch is due great respect from the
others. . . . Many decisions of this
Court, however, have unequivocally
reaffirmed the holding of Marbury
v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803),
that "it is emphatically the prov-
ince and duty of the judicial depart-
ment to say what the law is."Id., at
177.
... Since this Court has consis-
tently exercised the power to con-
strue and delineate claims arising
under express powers, it must fol-
low that the Court has authority to
interpret claims with respect to
powers alleged to derive from enu-
merated powers.39
To this the Court added:
However, neither the doctrine of
separation of powers, nor the need
for confidentiality of high level
communications, without more,
338 Fed. Reg. 30739.
342 U.S.L. Wk. 5240-41.39Id., at 5243.
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can sustain an absolute, unqualified
presidential privilege of immunity
from judicial process under all cir-
cumstances ...
The impediment that an abso-
lute, unqualified privilege would
place in the way of the primary
constitutional duty of the Judicial
Branch to do justice in criminal
prosecutions would plainly conflict
with the function of the courts
under Article III.4
From this the holding inexorably
followed:
In this case the President chal-
lenges a subpoena served on him as
a third party requiring the produc-
tion of materials for use in a crim-
inal prosecution on the claim that
he has a privilege against disclosure
of confidential communications ...
We conclude that when the
ground for asserting privilege as to
subpoenaed materials sought for
use in a criminal trial is based only
on the generalized interest in con-
fidentiality, it cannot prevail over
the fundamental demands of due
process of law in the fair adminis-
tration of criminal justice . . .41
Thus, at length, the nature and
condition of Article II discretionary
power has been judicially suggested;
the Burger opinion stresses the excep-
tional circumstances under which the
power may be judicially limited, but
equally important, it judicially recog-
nizes the existence of the power. As
Justice Holmes once stated in another
context, "a power which must belong
to and somewhere reside in every
civilized government" must ultimately
be found within the sense of the
Constitution. Or, as Justice Jackson
observed in 1952, "the art of govern-
ing under our Constitution does not
40 Id., at 5244.
41 Id., at 5246.
4 2 Cf. MiSsouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416,
417 (1920).
and cannot conform to . .. single Arti-
cles torn from context . . . Presidential
powers are not fixed but fluctuate,
depending upon their disjunction or
conjunction with those of Con-
gress." 43 The Steel Seizure Case, in
which Jackson made his comment,
established the judicial requirement
that, at least in domestic matters,
Presidential discretion was subject to
Congressional guidelines. The case of
United States v. Nixon now has added
the proposition that the discretion is
subject to judicial review.
Summary and Moral
In 1956 Presidential historian Clint-
on Rossiter wrote, concerning "occa-
sional abuses of power:"
The President is in position to do
serious damage, if not irreparable
injury, to the ideals and methods of
American democracy. Power that
can be used decisively can also be
abused grossly. No man can hold
such a concentration of authority
without feeling the urge, even
though the urge be honest and
patriotic, to push it beyond its
usual bounds. We must therefore
consider carefully the various safe-
guards that are counted upon to
keep the President's feet in paths of
constitutional righteousness ...
Blended together in judicious
amounts, powers and limits make
up a constitution, and the Presi-
dency is nothing if not a constitu-
tional office. Its powers are huge,
but they are of no real effect-they
4 3 Concurring opinion in Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. at 634
(1952).
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are not, strictly speaking, powers at
all-unless exercised through consti-
tutional forms and within constitu-
tional limits."
Discretion in the executive, in other
words, is discretion in the use of
discretion itself. To paraphrase a famil-
iar judicial aphorism, the only ultimate
curb on executive discretion is the
executive's own sense of restraint."
Or, as has been more recently stated,
''executive privilege is at most what
the words suggest-a privilege or op-
tion the President has, and not a duty.
There is no requirement that it be
asserted . .. [R] ather, it stands more
to be thrown into disrepute by its
selective use, as in the Watergate af-
fairs, when it has the appearance of a
cover-up."
Executive privilege or prerogative,
accordingly, is an option the American
people will tolerate to the degree that
they are persuaded that it is being
responsibly used. This, in turn, rests
largely upon the personal capacity of
the President to inspire confidence and
trust. There is danger of self-delusion,
of course, in cases of executives en-
dowed with the personal magnetism
which it has become fashionable to
call charisma-charisma being defined,
in this instance, as the quality of
goodness or even greatness which the
observer persuades himself his subject
must possess to be as believable as he
is. Thomas Carlyle saw virtue in this
type of hero-worship; 7 the modern
American, particularly after the
denouement of the summer of 1974, is
currently cynical about the matter.
4 Rossiter, The American Presidency
(1956), 33-34.
45 Cf. Stone, J., dissenting in United States
v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 87 (1936).
1 Van Alstyne, "President Nixon: Toughing
It Out With the Law," 59 A.B.A.J.
1398-99 (December 1973).
4 7 Cf. London & Westminster Review, No.
12 (1838).
Dettness and restraint, nevertheless,
will remain the touchstones for the
effective use of Presidential power of
all types. While it is true that the
President is ultimately responsible to
the electorate rather than to Con-
gress, 4 8  any legislative power exer-
cised by the President "must stem
either from an act of Congress or from
the Constitution itself."49  And as
Chief Justice Burger put it: "A Presi-
dent and those who assist him must be
free to explore alternatives in the
process of shaping policies and making
decisions and to do so in a way many
would be unwilling to express except
privately. These are the considerations
justifying a presumptive privilege for
presidential communications." To
which he added: "But this presump-
tive privilege must be considered in
light of our historic commitment to
the rule of law."so
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawy-
er, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952).
4
9 Id., at 585.
so42 U.S.L. Wk. 5245.
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